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ARMED FORCES

OUTLINE FOR INDOCTRINATION ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 6, Mar 81 (signed to press 7 Mar 81) pp 40-47

[Article by Candidate of Economic Sciences, Docent, Col B. Korniyenko: "The 26th Party Congress on the Economic Policy of the CPSU During the Period of Developed Socialism"]

[Excerpts] With the given subject the journal begins publishing materials devoted to the 26th CPSU Congress. Ten hours are to be devoted to studying it. This time can be divided as follows: 2 hours allocated for a lecture (narration), 4 hours for independent work and 4 for a seminar (talk).

In the lecture (narration) it is recommended that the following questions be examined: 1. The basic results of Soviet economic development in the 1970's and the Tenth Five-Year Plan. 2. The urgent national economic problems of the 1980's and the 11th Five-Year Plan. 3. The main directions for raising the prosperity of the Soviet people.

In a brief introduction, it is essential to emphasize that the Soviet people are presently living under the powerful impact of the work and approved decisions of the just completed 26th CPSU Congress. The congress has become an event of historic importance in the life of our party and the entire nation. It provided a profound assessment of the present state in the world; it summed up the results of the economic and social development of the USSR during the 10th Five-Year Plan and defined the strategy and tactics in the struggle for the coming stage of communist construction.

The results of Soviet national economic development in the 1970's and the 10th Five-Year Plan convincingly affirm the correctness of the party's economic strategy. "The nation," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out in the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress, "has advanced substantially in all areas of creating the material and technical base of communism. A qualitatively new level has been reached by the productive forces of Soviet society. The scientific and technical revolution is developing in depth and breadth, in altering the appearance of many types of production and entire sectors. Soviet science holds leading positions in the most important areas of knowledge. The nation's economic might dependably guarantees further progress on the path of communist construction."

The 26th CPSU Congress focused the communists and all Soviet people on active, creative labor for the sake of communism, at a further rise in production efficiency and work quality and the steady search for new reserves for our economic growth. Inspired by the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the workers of our nation are fully determined to carry them out, to achieve new successes in all areas of communist creativity and to further raise the might and authority of our great motherland.

1. Basic Results in the Economic Development of the USSR in the 1970's and the Tenth Five-Year Plan

In beginning to give the material of the first question, it must be pointed out that national economic management is the core of all party and state activities. "It is precisely in the economic area," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "that the foundation is laid for solving social problems, for strengthening the defense capability of the nation, as well as a foundation for an active foreign policy. Precisely here are created the necessary prerequisites for the successful advance of Soviet society toward communism."

In entering the 1970's, the party thoroughly analyzed the state of the national economy and defined the main ways for solving the socioeconomic problems of developed socialism. The starting point of the party and political approach to the economy was and remains the unchanged demand of the program--all for the sake of man, all for the good of man. Hence the line of the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses of a deeper turning of the national economy to the diverse tasks related to raising the prosperity of the people, to a transition to intensive economic growth factors and to a rise in the efficiency and quality of all work.

This has been the orientation of the CPSU economic policy for an extended period. The plenums of the CPSU Central Committee devoted to economic construction played an important role in its creative development and in mobilizing the communists and all the workers to carry out this policy. These plenums provided a profound analysis of the state of affairs in the national economy and focused the party's attention on unsolved problems. Each of them in essence was a school of socialist management and taught our cadres and all the party the science and art of economic management.

2. The Urgent National Economic Problems of the 1980's and the 11th Five-Year Plan

In beginning to give the material on the second question, it is important to point out that the Communist Party, having built developed socialism in our nation, has armed the Soviet people with an integrated and clear, scientifically sound economic strategy for the present and long-run stages of communist construction. This strategy logically continues the party's Leninist course of creating the material and technical basis of communism, raising the standard of living of the people and ensuring the defense capability of the nation. A profound and thorough Marxist-Leninist description of the party's economic strategy under the conditions of a developed socialist society has been given by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his reports at the 24th, 25th and 26th CPSU congresses.

In accord with the plans of the 26th CPSU Congress, during the 1980's, the communist party will consistently continue carrying out an economic strategy, the highest

aim of which is a continuous rise in the material and cultural standard of living of the people and the creating of better conditions for the all-round development of the individual. The main task of the 11th Five-Year Plan is also aimed at this. This task consists in ensuring a further rise in the prosperity of the Soviet people on a basis of the steady, on-going development of the national economy, the acceleration of scientific and technical progress and the conversion of the economy to an intensive path of development, the more rational utilization of the nation's production potential, the greatest possible savings of all types of resources and an improvement in the quality of work.

3. The Main Directions for Raising the Prosperity of the Soviet People

In beginning to give the material of the third question, it is important to emphasize that the development of our economy has as its highest goal a constant increase in the material and cultural standard of living of the Soviet people. For the 11th Five-Year Plan and the 1980's as a whole, the party has put forward a broad program for further raising the prosperity of the Soviet people. This program encompasses an improvement in all aspects of the life of the Soviet people including consumption and housing, culture and recreation, working and living conditions. Over the five-year plan, more than 16 billion rubles are to be invested in increasing wages and other payments and benefits to the public. The minimum old age and disability pensions will be increased for workers, white collar personnel and kolkhoz members and other measures will also be carried out to further improve social security for the public. There are plans to strengthen state aid to families with children.

In concluding the lecture (narration) it is essential to point out again that the decisions of the highest forum of our party are a document of enormous sociopolitical significance. They outline the strategy and tactics of the struggle during the new stage of communist construction. Our people are fully determined to make the 1980's a decade of great labor accomplishments. All progressive mankind sees in the economic and defense might of the Soviet state a reliable support in the struggle for the security of peoples, against the aggressive aspirations of imperialism and its supporters, in the struggle for a bright future for the workers.

During the hours of independent study, it is recommended that the students read Section II of the Report of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy" (PRAVDA, 24 February 1981); the Report of the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. A. Tikhonov, "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990" (PRAVDA, 28 February 1981); "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990" (PRAVDA, 5 March 1981).

In the seminar (talk) it is desirable to discuss the following questions: 1. Basic results of USSR national economic development in the 1970's. 2. The main task of the 11th Five-Year Plan. 3. Particular features of CPSU economic policy in the 1980's. 4. The influence of scientific and technical progress on national economic development. 5. The party's concern for raising the material prosperity of the people.

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4. D. F. Ustinov, "Loyal to the Party Cause," PRAVDA, 21 February 1981.

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ARMED FORCES

PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAINING FOR COMBAT

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 6, Mar 81 (signed to press 7 Mar 81) pp 48-52

[Article by Candidate of Psychological Sciences, Docent, Col V. Varvarov: "Psychological Readiness for Combat"*)]

[Text] Psychological training, being organically interrelated with moral-political and combat training, should develop in the Soviet military such essential qualities in combat as courage, bravery, tenacity, resourcefulness and stability of reactions under the most difficult conditions. On this level daily training of the personnel as close as possible to combat reality opens up the most favorable opportunities for the commanders and chiefs to temper their subordinates and to improve their skills and readiness for able combat operations. The task of the organizers of the training process is to make skillful use of these opportunities, to plan and conduct the drills and exercises considering a maximum benefit from them and to mobilize the personnel to consciously master the science of winning and make rational use of the training time. "Combat sets strict rules and in combat one does not say wait while we learn," combat veterans well remember. Hence, in the course of the daily exercises of each man it is essential to create conditions so that he works at full force and constantly remembers that indulgences and oversimplification are incompatible with true preparations for countering a strong, technically well-equipped enemy.

The specific ways for bringing the training situation closer to the conditions of modern combat are very diverse and are determined primarily by the combat use of one or another branch of troops. However, in all instances such simulation is aimed at creating mental, physical and psychological stress which is possible in an actual clash with the enemy. This explains the exceptional importance of the most complicated variations of field, air and sea skills of the personnel.

The role of psychological training at present, particularly in line with the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, has immeasurably risen. In modern combat the

*The article is recommended for use in exercises for commander training in studying the factors of modern combat which influence the psyche of soldiers and the ways and means for the psychological strengthening of the personnel.

real situation will have an unprecedented affect on people and maximally heighten their emotional impressions and experiences. The conditioning acquired by the men in the course of daily training will be a guarantee for the surmounting of these negative factors and will help to maintain in any situations psychological strength and a will for victory.

The commander as the organizer of the training of subordinates must be fully aware that the situation of nuclear missile combat involves much that is unknown and unexpected and this, naturally, cannot be fully experienced in exercises and training drills. In such a situation the personnel for the first time will encounter an understanding of the enormous destruction, and for the first time they will grasp the huge losses involved. Moreover the enemy will always endeavor to use particular, previously unemployed tactical moves. In line with this the necessity arises of knowing and anticipating what influence the very fact of surprise and the unknown can have on the conduct of the men in combat.

It has been established that unknown and unexpected signal stimuli cause a response in the brain which reduces the dependability of control over the current activities of a man. Naturally, the stronger the stimuli the greater the probability of negative consequences. In terms of a situation of modern combat, this means that the unknown and surprise can significantly complicate the carrying out of combat missions by the personnel. This determines the increased necessity of acquiring experience ahead of time on the conduct of men in the most difficult situations. With good reason the practice of conducting exercises now inevitably includes all sorts of methods for recreating the sound effects of combat, having aircraft fly low over the battle formations, the artillery fire over the heads of the troops, tanks rolling over the personnel, landing at an unknown area, working out tasks for damage control on a ship and much else.

An analysis of the practices of advanced commanders indicates that the arsenal of their training methods includes many other, particular methods for creating surprise and the unknown in exercises. It is very important to more fully utilize this experience so that a complicated combat situation and the conditions of the unknown and the new are created not only in the course of major exercises and maneuvers but also become a permanent component element in daily training.

A combat situation has a very complicated effect on the emotional and sensory sphere of an individual. It activates and determines a whole range of emotions. In the soldier positive feelings are maximally heightened, and these help to strengthen combat morale. At the same time, insufficiently trained and conditioned men can give way to a lack of confidence and confusion, and this cannot help but tell negatively on the state of combat activeness. To exclude such negative manifestations means in the course of the training process to indefatigably "polish up" psychological stability of subordinates, to show creativity, particularly in individual work with the men, and to skillfully use advanced experience in training and indoctrinational practices. In this regard the views of the commander of the nuclear missile-carrying submarine "60 Let Velikogo Oktyabrya" are instructive.

"When the ship loudspeaker system," he relates, "repeats the command that I have just given 'Missile Attack,' I, like all the crew, experience the same feelings that take possession of the Soviet military, regardless of what branch of troops

they belong to, at the moment of going over to an attack. These are feelings of a combat upsurge, a strong inner mobilizing of forces and readiness to dedicate everything to achieve success. There is one other very important feeling for each man, particularly for a commander, which brings confidence in combat, and this is a sensation of a unity of thoughts and actions of everyone involved in the missile attack.

"There is nothing more unpleasant for a commander," he concludes, "than at the moment of crucial actions to feel a failure somewhere, to detect a lack of coordination or to lose confidence in even one man."

In the system of feelings which have a negative influence on combat activities, usually fear is particularly stressed. It must be said that there is a fundamental difference in the very approach to its definition in Soviet military psychology and modern bourgeois psychology. Bourgeois psychology, in proceeding from false positions on the biologization of the individual, considers such a feeling to be a direct manifestation of the instinct for self-preservation and consequently an obligatory reaction to any fear. Soviet researchers explain the phenomenon from truly scientific, methodological positions, on a basis of its thorough study. In terms of a combat situation, this response of the human organism to fear, in using a simplified illustrative scheme, can be explained as follows.

The signal information on danger is received by the subcortical centers of the brain. If the signal is of vitally important significance, the subcortex immediately "switches on" the instinct of self-preservation. A person runs away from an approaching machine before he can even be afraid, or ducks his head hearing the whistle of bullets. Obviously this was how the ironic expression of previous combat veterans "to bow to bullets" appeared. But in fact, the bullet had already passed by, the sound was later because its speed was less. You did not hear "your own" bullet.

Then the danger signal enters the cortex of the brain which is the "commander-in-chief" of human conduct and it has the "last word." And if at this moment the conviction of the necessity to carry out a combat mission "prevails," then the danger signal may not be taken "into attention" or completely "rejected" as insufficiently significant. Consequently, in combat in meeting danger the feeling of fear can appear and have a disorganizing influence on activity; it can arise and immediately be suppressed and eliminated by a stronger feeling, and, finally, instead of it, a feeling of combat excitement can be activated in response to danger.

A remarkable analysis of the influence of combat on human conduct is given in the book by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "Malaya Zemlya." In it the particular features of the response to danger are taken up in an extremely profound and penetrating manner.

Let us recall the meeting of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev with a soldier on the Sukhum Highway who, returning from the hospital to a reserve unit, intentionally lagged behind the group, and to the question: "Why did you violate discipline?" replied:

"I did not run off to the rear, but rather to my unit."

"Where is it?"

"There, in the heat of things, waiting for an attack by the krauts..." "Just think," L. I. Brezhnev wrote further. "A person on a legitimate basis may not go into battle. At least he had received a deferment and still did not know where he must go. But he was in a hurry to get back in battle." Certainly this episode is eloquent confirmation that danger certainly does not always cause a response in the form of a feeling of fear. It, this feeling, as is shown by the heroics of the Great Patriotic War and the military feats of the men under peacetime conditions, "in dishonor leaves the battlefield," being decisively eliminated by stronger moral-political factors.

Will power is one such factor. By volitional effort a soldier can and should control his deeds and actions. From this it follows that in the process of psychological training it is essential to pay particular attention to forming steadfastness, restraint, decisiveness and boldness and see to it that the men gain experience in combat self-control in dangerous and difficult situations.

In creating an unfailing determination of the personnel to carry out any combat missions, the determining role is played by the commander who relies on the communists. The party members are the backbone of a military collective and are the people who maintain self-possession under the most difficult conditions. Their steadfastness and stubbornness are a guarantee for inspiring fellow servicemen. Combat requires from the commander above all continuous leadership of subordinates, a knowledge of the situation, the working out of correct decisions and the maintaining of proper order and organization.

Particularly high demands are placed on the solely-responsible commander for his own conduct. The very position obliges the leader to justify his calling. An officer is constantly in view and in any situation his actions are a guide for subordinates. The experience of the previous war eloquently showed that the inspiring example of a commander in combat possesses an exceptional impact. This applies equally to the conditions of daily training. In a clash with a hypothetical enemy, the most experienced the self-exacting organizers of combat training, in using the force of personal example, inevitably achieve good training indicators. Here is confirmation of this from the experience of the commander of the leading subunit, Capt K. Pavlov.

In a tactical exercise his subordinates had to operate under a maximally complex situation. They were to attack an "enemy" strongpoint, to repel counterattacks by its infantry and tanks and cross a zone of "radioactive contamination." In the following stage, they were given the order to cross a water barrier under the conditions of fire resistance. The men carried out this task, after which they suppressed several firing points and carried out radiological decontamination of the weapons and military equipment. As was pointed out at the analysis, the exercise showed the high preparedness of the personnel. At the same time it was particularly emphasized that the combat capabilities of each man were fully in evidence due to the inspiring effect of the subunit commander as expressed in his excellent understanding of the situation, intelligent decisions, clear commands and confidence in victory over the "enemy."

It must be added that Capt Pavlov is one of those officers who gives daily attention to the psychological preparedness of his subordinates for combat. His work in

this area is based on sound knowledge. He requires the same from the platoon and squad commanders, and this ultimately tells favorably on the training of all the men. Here in working through combat exercises, they have virtually excluded instances of oversimplification and for the purposes of reproducing a situation of real combat skilled use is made of simulators, training films and other aids.

In the practices of Capt Pavlov and a number of other commanders, one should note the psychologically justified procedures of training drills for subordinates on combat equipment. They all conceive of and carry out the regular specialist exercises as a new step in working out combat methods in remembering that a mechanical, monotonous repetition of even familiar actions cannot cause creative activity. The constantly aroused interest in training sessions contributes to rapidly achieving mastery and to gaining opportunities for the combat use of the weapons and serviced equipment under the most difficult conditions.

Officer N. Yermolayev who organizes the working-out of training standards in precisely this manner advises, in particular, to resort to simulation of combat and emergency damage as often as possible. "The created situations," he explains, "require from the specialists nonroutine decisions, a boldness of thought, resourcefulness and cool-headedness. A training exercise conducted under a tense psychological situation thus is as close as possible to combat. The subordinates develop the skills of creatively approaching the carrying out of combat training tasks and the practical use of their own knowledge, abilities and experience." One cannot help but agree with this conclusion. And it conforms fully to the scientific conclusions and recommendations.

Psychological conditioning of the men by the means of physical training requires special attention from a commander. The neglecting of this opportunity often is a consequence of an insufficient understanding of the problem and the underestimation of the conclusions and recommendations of research specialists. As a rule, at physical training exercises universal exercises are better developed while this is less so for special exercises which correspond to the combat employment of certain categories of servicemen.

For example, take the operator of an antitank guided missile. It is no secret that he must remain immobile for a long period of time. The static position, naturally, causes a special form of fatigue. Noise and the flickering of the screens in turn tend to lessen attention. The negative effect of these factors can be lessened by systematic exercises which strengthen sharpness of responses with a change in the situation or by improving the vestibular apparatus and the spatial orientation of the specialist. With extended performance of duties, it is advisable to give him "job-type" exercises such as rotating the head, twisting the trunk, bending over and so forth.

There are scientifically based procedural studies for the physical conditioning of military specialists of various types. In using the recommended complexes, it is important, in following the experience of the ablest exercise leaders, to carefully dose the physical stresses and to give preference to those exercises which contribute most to effective combat work by the men.

As was pointed out above, a combat situation, in being reflected in the conscience of people, has an enormous impact on their psyche. However, this impact in individual men differs and can substantially vary in terms of its characteristics and content. Thus, of all the states which arise under the influence of a combat situation, the state of stress is the most difficult to analyze. Its influence on the stability and reliability of activity varies. A moderate state of stress activates all the psychological functions of a person and helps to shorten the adaptation time. But excessive stress has a negative effect. There are two forms of its manifestation: a standstill, when activity is reduced or stops totally, the coordination of movements is disrupted, and memory deteriorates or is lost; a second type characterized by the appearance of uncontrollable, unanalyzed activity, by chaotic movements and conduct.

The question arises of where is the point up to which stress is a positive phenomenon and where is the point beginning from which stress is disorganizing. It is impossible to precisely answer this question outside of a specific situation, specific activity or specific individual. But an immediate commander or leader who profoundly knows his subordinates and their psychological features can and should see these limits. This is all the more important because at present, with the saturating of the Army and Navy with complicated automated systems, there is a rather significant category of military specialists whose combat work could be defined as the activities of an operator in a complex automated system. And under these conditions, when men are working at stress levels close to the critical points, it is completely unacceptable to have threats, shouts or excessive curtness in relations, for instead of increasing activities this can lead to the appearance of mistakes, failings and disruptions of the time parameters which determine the schedule and procedure of individual actions. Here words of approval and support are of greater use.

The commander must know and respond sensitively to the indications which allow one to judge the stress level of subordinates. A knowledge of these signs and the ability to evaluate them, proceeding from the individual features of subordinates, make it possible for a commander to correctly select the ways and means of influence and to control the state of stress in the personnel.

Real combat will have an enormous influence on the individual as a whole. For the commander and political workers of all levels this will require complete self-dedication, a high level of knowledge and thorough preparedness in moral-political, military-professional and psychological-pedagogical terms. It is also essential to bear in mind that the crucial condition for the manifestation of all particular psychological functions is the level and degree of formativeness of such leading qualities of a personality as character and inclinations and these, in turn, are based on ideology. Precisely the scientificness and soundness of ideological views, ideological conviction and strength and a profound awareness by the men of their sacred duty to the motherland will determine the successful execution of combat missions by the personnel.

In conclusion we must again emphasize that modern combat with the use of new weapons and equipment, including nuclear missiles, requires thorough preparation. Only a soldier who is ideologically, professionally, physically and psychologically tempered can be victorious in this combat. Effective activities in this area by the commanders and chiefs and all organizers of the training and indoctrination process

are the guarantee for the steady progress of each soldier and for the unfailing fulfillment by the personnel of the subunits, units and ships of the party's demand to be in a constant state of combat readiness which would guarantee an immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

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NAVAL FORCES

POLITICAL WORK IN THE BLACK SEA FLEET

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 6, Mar 81 (signed to press 7 Mar 81) pp 30-34

[Article by Sr Lt V. Myasnikov: "By All Forms of Propaganda"]

[Text] A new chapter has been opened in the chronicle of communist construction; this is the 11th Five-Year Plan. Its content has been defined by the 26th CPSU Congress. The congress decisions contain a magnificent program of creation and an appeal by the party to all the Soviet people, including to the men of the Army and Navy, to dedicate all their force and energy to improving the quality and efficiency of labor and to strengthening the economic and defense might of the socialist motherland.

To propagandize and explain the decisions of the party forum which has opened up new horizons for our party and nation is a high honor and great responsibility. This is precisely how the party activists of one of the units understand their duty. The communists of the unit discussed how to more closely link the study and explanation of the congress materials with the concrete tasks of the seamen, to increase the influence of the propagandist's word on the military and political training of the men and to raise the scientific and ideological level of each measure. In the search for ways to strengthen the ideological influence on the personnel, to strengthen the tie between propaganda and life and to improve the forms and methods for indoctrinating the men they proceeded from the demands and recommendations of the 26th CPSU Congress.

One of the most efficient and proven forms of influencing the men is the unified political day. Immediately after the end of the high party forum a decision was taken to devote it to a propagandizing of the materials of the party congress. The political workers, Officers N. Kulikov, N. Sez'ko, V. Yaroslavtsev and V. Tikhii, each in their own area, thought out the content and form of the measures. Here they endeavored to consider the composition of the audience and reflected on how to make the political day somehow different and not like those which had been previously. And they largely succeeded.

The political day started by speeches given by a number of commanders and political workers directly on the ships. Using vivid, convincing facts, examples and figures, the speakers showed the lasting historical significance of the party congress which had been held. Each communist who took the floor that day proved himself to be a

true ideological fighter and in a convincing and passionate manner brought the tasks and ideas posed by the party and the decisions approved by the congress to the hearts and minds of all the listeners. As was planned, the speeches ended with a lively authoritative discussion about the training, service and everyday life of the seamen, about the still unresolved problems and about what reserves for increasing the efficiency of military service could be put into operation in order to make a worthy reply to the congress decisions. On the same day the men heard speeches by the delegate of the 26th CPSU Congress and military council member, the chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet, Rear Adm R. N. Likhvonin, and the delegate of the 26th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, Hero of Socialist Labor, the brigade leader of pipe braziers from the Sevastopol' Naval Yard imeni Sergo Ordzhonikidze, N. V. Bagrintsev.

In the second half of the day, in the Heroes' Avenue located in the unit, a meeting was held between the men and the veterans of the Great Patriotic War, Heroes of the Soviet Union Capt 1st Rank (Ret) A. K. Abdrakmanov and Capt 3d Rank (Ret) I. P. Shengur. The famous Black Sea torpedo boat sailors told how they and their comrades in arms fought for the Soviet motherland during the severe years of hardships and how the communists led the men to feats for the sake of victory. In their speeches there rang clearly an order to the young soldiers to be faithful to the cause of the Communist Party and to reliably protect the peaceful creative labor of the Soviet people.

A group of men made an excursion to the municipal garment mill imeni Zoya Kosmodem'yanskaya. Having visited in the shops of the leading enterprise and having met and talked with the workers and engineers, the sailors were convinced with their own eyes with what enthusiasm and inspiration the workers have taken to carrying out the decisions of the party congress and they were even more acutely aware of their responsibility to protect the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

In the evening the subunits and ships of the unit showed documentary films devoted to the labor victories of the Soviet people. After the screen had gone blank, the sailors were talked to by propagandists, agitators, petty officers and seamen who prior to service had worked at those enterprises and construction projects which had just been described in the language of film. They told of what had been left out, of the economic and social development of these areas of the nation as planned by the 26th Party Congress. For example, interesting information was given by the Volga Area resident, PO 2d Class A. Korneyev, about the atomic power plant and by the native of the Bryansk Area, Sn V. Dardykin on agricultural development in the Nonchernozem Zone. The men ended their speeches with concrete conclusions for practical activities and urged their fellow servicemen to improve their military skills even more tenaciously.

In the course of the unified political day, the communists convincingly disclosed the historic significance of the party congress in the creative elaboration and implementation of the wise Leninist domestic and foreign policy, the increased leading role of our party in communist construction and in directing the Armed Forces and its practical activities in developing the material and technical base of communism and strengthening the defense capability of the nation.

On a number of ships there were special-subject evening and morning meetings on "The Motherland Moves Forward," "A New Stage in Communist Construction" and "The

Good of the People--The Highest Goal of the Party." The communists gave particular attention to the effectiveness of these measures. They made certain that all speeches here were marked not only by a profound ideological content but also by an emotional uplift. For this purpose workers from the Marxism-Leninism university under the fleet political directorate and the office of political education were involved in the oral propaganda. Speaking to the men were the chief of the Marxism-Leninism university Capt 2d Rank R. Avanesov, a participant in many long cruises with a good knowledge of naval life, as well as the experienced lecturer, Candidate of Economic Sciences, Docent M. Zabolotnyy, and the lecturer on international affairs I. Shevchenko. Along with explaining the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and propagandizing the Soviet way of life, they reminded the listeners of the complexity and acuteness of the present international situation, they brought out the reasons for this and pointed out that under conditions where the United States and its close NATO allies are intensifying the arms race, the defenders of our motherland must raise vigilance, combat readiness and iron military discipline to the highest limits.

Above, mention was made about the meeting of the men of the unit with workers from the local enterprises. Such meetings have become traditional. They are a good form for an all-round and vivid demonstration of carrying out the party's domestic policy at the present stage and of the major achievements of the Soviet way of life. One such meeting was held soon after the end of the 26th CPSU Congress. Invited as guests of the sailors were workers from the leading enterprise in the south of the Ukraine, the Balaklava Ore Administration imeni A. M. Gor'kiy and including Hero of Socialist Labor, the excavator operator N. I. Semenets, the well-driller V. D. Kovalanko, the crusher operator V. G. Tkachuk and the excavator operator I. M. Kovalev. The sailors and workers shared their achievements in honor of the party congress and told how they had begun to carry out the decisions approved at it. The sailors learned that on the opening day of the party forum, the brigade of I. M. Kovalev produced 10,000 tons of high quality raw material for the nation above the plan. And they told the workers of the ore administration that on the eve of the congress, the ship crews had carried out gunnery exercises excellently.

The sailors also visited their sponsors, the light industry machine building plant. The 26th CPSU Congress, as is known, brought up the necessity of creating highly efficient systems of machines and equipment which will mechanize the production processes in light industry. The leading production workers of the enterprise V. K. Sokolov, N. G. Ionov and others told about their work and how they are struggling to carry out the tasks posed by the party. Participating in this meeting were not only the Black Sea sailors WO ["michman"] A. Sidorov, PO 2d Class S. Voronin, Smn V. Trifonov and others, but also the veterans of the Great Patriotic War, Hero of the Soviet Union Capt 3d Rank (Ret) I. P. Shengur and Rear Adm (Ret) V. T. Protsenko. The meeting developed into a stirring dialogue of different generations about a feeling of duty to the motherland, the party and the Soviet people and about loyalty to communist ideals. At present the Black Sea sailors are waiting for a visit by a worker delegation to them.

The literary and artistic morning meetings "Communism is the Youth of the World and It Will be Built by the Youth" with the participation of literary and art figures have helped to strengthen the upsurge in the political and military activeness of the men caused by the preparations for and holding of the party congress and to

vividly propagandize the inspired, unstinting labor for the good of the socialist fatherland. Thus not long ago the sailors had an interesting meeting with the poets from the hero city of Sevastopol', the members of the USSR Writers' Union A. Krasovskiy, I. Tuckov and A. Ozerov. Speaking to the sailors was the author of the book "Sevastopol'skiy Bronepoyezd" [The Sevastopol' Armored Train] N. Aleksandrov and the Honored Artist of the Ukraine A. Makarov. And each time in the course of these meetings the sailors were participants in a major, interesting discussion of the moral make-up of our young man and how the youth, under the leadership of the party, is taking an active part in communist construction, showing both courage, will, skill and a true fighting spirit in this.

The diverse forms and means of work aimed at explaining the decisions of the party congress to a significant degree influence the process of the indoctrination and training of the men and the results of military and political training. The unit of ships was declared to be a leading one in the Navy and is presently securely holding its won positions. This has also been aided by the activities of the primary party organizations which have increased their role and have become, as the CPSU Central Committee requires, true centers for the daily ideological and indoctrinational activities. Take one of the ships where the close-knit collective of party workers has shown what it can do. Immediately after the end of the congress, they carefully planned their work and together discussed how it could be made scientific, concrete and aggressive. What was characteristic was that here they tried to consider the opinion of each communist. Emphasis was placed on the placement of the aktiv and on the fullest coverage of all the sailors by propaganda measures.

In accord with the plan, lectures and reports are given as well as talks on the congress materials. The organizers of the measures consider the particular features of the military professions, the length of service and the national composition of the servicemen. The political worker V. Popov is a convinced supporter of the creative approach to the indoctrination of the men. He and others are firmly convinced that formalism and routine cause serious harm and undermine the men's confidence in the propagandist's word and in many of our indoctrinational efforts. Both he himself, the ship commander, Capt 3d Rank V. Yavorin, the party organization secretary MO A. Panov and the commanders of the departments have shown a feeling of great responsibility in approaching an explanation of the materials and decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and in the ideological indoctrination of the sailors.

Here in the range of propaganda measures a special place is held by the Lenin lesson "We are Studying Communism, We are Defending Communism." In his introductory speech, the ship commander V. Yavorin, using vivid examples, in an understandable way explained to the men the basic provisions of the recording they had just heard of the speech of V. I. Lenin "Appeal to the Red Army," and he closely linked these ideas with the instructions of the 26th CPSU Congress on further strengthening the combat capability of our nation. The officer gave particular attention to the complex international situation, he told what it was in the area where the ship was to go on a cruise, and reminded the men of the necessity of constant vigilance and the precise carrying out of duties by all. The sailors were deeply impressed by the penetrating words of the commander on love for the motherland and hate for its enemies and by his indignant statements about the numerous crimes of international imperialism which everywhere is sowing terror and violence and endeavoring to undermine socialism and block social changes in the world.

The participants of the Lenin lesson ardently discussed how they in fact would carry out the legacy of the great Lenin on vigilance, discipline and constant combat readiness and the instructions of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on defense questions. They also discussed whether they were worthily continuing the traditions of their fathers and grandfathers. Sr Smm V. Igantukhin, Smm A. Vinogradov and many others spoke about this in their comments. They unanimously approved the idea voiced by the commander that, in responding to the decisions of the party congress, they should achieve even more than what was planned in the socialist obligations. And soon thereafter at a general meeting of the ship personnel, increased obligations were approved in which the men gave their word to reduce the time to bring the ship to combat readiness, to carry out all gunnery exercises with only excellent grades, to extend the operating life of the equipment and weapons and to save an additional amount of fuel.

In explaining the provisions and conclusions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the ship communists endeavor to closely tie them to the concrete tasks of the personnel and to stress the unsolved problems. The commander, the political worker and the party bureau members try to acustom all the communists to thoroughly analyzing the measures being carried out and focus them on the principledness and great exactingness for subordinates which is also permeated with paternal concern for them. Here they endeavor to analyse together the state of ideological and political indoctrination on the ship and to draw lessons from the shortcomings and mistakes.

Here is just one example. On the eve of a party meeting in one of the departments, the ship commander, the political worker, the department commander and the party group organizer discussed together how to make certain that the meeting was held in a business-like manner so that each communist would be fully aware of what tasks stem from the requirements of the 26th Party Congress for him and on what unsolved problems they must still work. The department commander and the party group organizer brought out the problem of the training of young specialists and wondered how to raise the quality level of this work.

Here definite positive experience has been gained. Thus, there has been a continuous rise in the quality of specialist training by the communists V. Parkov, V. Shimanskiy and V. Parkhomenko. The technical skills of the young officers are also rising. Due to the good quality of planned preventive inspections and repairs, the operating life of the equipment and weapons is being extended. But at the same time, there have been instances of a loss of training time, the poor working out of various questions in the training program and the slow dissemination of the experience of the masters of military specialties. In a word, there are still things to work on and no room for complacency with what has been achieved. This important idea was given full voice at a party meeting of the department communists and focused each of them on unstinting military service.

The ship passed the navigation problems with excellent grades, and the highest grade was given to the crew's actions during sea exercises. The courageous actions of the sailors in the difficult conditions of a sea voyage became an example of high ideological conditioning and moral strength. It happened that the cable of a fishing trawl became entangled around the ship's propeller. The weather was worsening with every hour, and it would be dangerous to wait for help dead in the water. Then the communists, Officer A. Zubkov, PO 1st Class V. Molchanov and PO 2d Class D. Markus were the first to enter the water. For 4 hours they worked under water in scuba diving gear until the propeller was cleared of the cable. Thus in practice

the party members carry out their vanguard role in the life of the troop collective and are the first to go where it is difficult and where a personal example is needed of bold and self-sacrificing actions.

The main condition for the success of the ideological work carried out in the unit and on the ships to propagandize and explain the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress to the personnel is the fact that it is closely tied to the life and tasks of the sailors and is directed to the men and to their concerns and thoughts. The communists clearly differentiate the tasks stemming from these decisions for the sailor collective, for strengthening the discipline and organization of the personnel and for raising the vigilance and combat readiness of the defenders of the motherland. In these stirring postcongress days, particular elation reigns in each subunit and on each ship. The sailors are fully determined to carry out the instructions of their party and to honorably carry out any order of the fatherland.

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COLONEL GENERAL A. MIRONENKO DISCUSSES NAVAL AVIATION

Moscow KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jan 81 p 4

[Interview with the commander-in-chief of naval aviation Colonel General A. A. Mironenko, by V. Snegirev; date and place not given]

[Text] The commander-in-chief of naval aviation Colonel General, Hero of the Soviet Union, A. A. Mironenko answers KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA's questions.

[Question] Aleksandr Alekseyevich, the history of the Komsomol support of aviation has been visibly reflected in your life for you were actually a Komsomol conscript. Please tell us about your path to the heavens.

[Answer] I would say that my path was characteristic of hundreds and thousands of people of my generation. I joined the Komsomol in 1933 as a 15 year old youth studying at the railroad school in the city of Krasnodar. After graduation I studied at the Leningrad Machinery Institute. In 1937, through a Komsomol call-up, I suddenly turned my sail--into military aviation. I was perfectly conscious of the necessity for such a step--it was necessary, first of all, in the interests of defending the motherland.

After graduating from the Yeyakaya naval flight school I was assigned to the military air force of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, but the war began soon afterwards and I, essentially a recent student, had to go into action immediately. We mastered the science of fighting and conquering first-hand during the battles.

Other young pilots fought the enemy alongside me. The majority of these pilots had, like myself, received their start in flying from the Komsomol. They were wonderful lads; I would say, the best of the best. The highest feeling of duty, boundless courage, initiative, and selflessness distinguished them. I recall my schoolmate Viktor Belikov--his plane was hit over the sea and Viktor rammed his burning plane into a fascist ship. He destroyed the enemy at the cost of his own life.

[Question] At 25 you were given command of a fighter regiment, at 26 you were a Hero of the Soviet Union and your regiment was awarded two orders. What placed you, a young pilot, into the ranks of the ace, the competent and skillful commanders?

[Answer] My combat slogan was "to fly as much as possible, to carry out the most complicated missions." Some 752 combat missions, 96 air battles, and 20 fascist planes shot down--this was my modest contribution to the total victory. Our regiment in one year alone--from July 1943 to July 1944--destroyed 178 enemy planes in air battles and was elevated to Guard's status for this. Its backbone, I repeat, consisted of green lads--Komsomol members and young communists.

After the war ended I continued to serve in different command positions, mastered various types of new aircraft, and flew over many oceans and seas.

[Question] Our conversation can evidently serve as a good occasion for you to acquaint the readers of KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA with naval aviation. What is unique about this branch of the service? What are its missions and capabilities?

[Answer] I will begin by telling you what we are justly proud of. Do you know, for example, that navy pilot Anatoliy Lyapidevskiy was awarded Gold Star number one? The North Sea ace Boris Safonov became the first two-time Hero of the Soviet Union in the war years. In August 1941, i.e., in our country's most difficult hour, it was our very bombers, led by Hero of the Soviet Union Ye. N. Preobrazhenskiy, who made bold raids on Berlin. Finally, the first cosmonaut--Yuriy Gagarin--was a Northern Fleet fighter pilot before entering the space program. The following is how naval aviation has raised such renowned falcons.

Our pilots must fly under the most diverse conditions over many of the world's seas and oceans. It is still night on the Baltic while the sun has been shining for quite a while over Kamchatka; there is ice, snow, and fog at the poles and burning heat on the Black Sea. Everywhere--however difficult it may be--a pilot's life is subordinated to a single rhythm--improving combat readiness and increasing training status and skills. Day and night there are flights, flights, and more flights.

Naval aviation is a special branch of the armed forces. We naval pilots say this not because we like to stand out. In the first place, this is an air force of two elements--the sky and the ocean. I would even say this: our pilots must accomplish their missions under conditions where one element is increased by another element. Difficult conditions, such as a hydrometeorological condition which is extremely difficult to predict beforehand, always accompany flights in the air over seas and oceans. The total absence of landmarks makes it difficult to determine locations. Besides that, the pilots are continually mindful that there is great risk to life and an acute feeling of danger because they cannot land on the ocean when possible aircraft failure occurs.

I will note yet another flight complication. The actions of foreign military ships and planes do not always conform to the established norms of international law--they hinder flights, and sometimes are also of a directly provocative nature. All of this taken together severely tests the psychological make-up of military pilots. They must have strong nerves so that they will not lose their heads or flinch in such a situation, but will continue to carry out the established tasks.

In naval aviation all difficulties are doubled, so to speak, and therefore we must have people of doubled bravery who are raised to the second power of responsibility and discipline, people with fleet spirit, a strong arm and a sharp eye.

In the equipment field, today we have aircraft that can stay in the sky for dozens of hours, can cover many thousands of kilometers, and can carry the most modern weaponry. Naval aviation helicopters and airplanes can detect and destroy an enemy submarine in practically any area of the world's ocean.

Today some helicopters and airplanes are based directly on naval combat vessels which has significantly broadened their capabilities.

They say that henceforth the sailors have fraternally shared the sea with the pilots. However, the pilots are not really in their debt; they have shared the sky with the sailors by making them directly control the flights of airplanes and helicopters.

[Question] Aleksandr Alekseyevich, recently I met one of those ships and the pilots who serve on it. The size of this anti-submarine cruiser, its combat power, modern aviation equipment, particularly the vertical take-off aircraft, are staggering. However, the most staggering fact of all is that the average age of the naval pilots to whom this astonishing, almost fantastic equipment, has been entrusted is 25. Their commander is hardly 30, and absolutely all personnel are young communists and Komsomol members. This automatically suggests a similarity to your own recollections of the war years. Are naval aviation traditions alive then?

[Answer] Yes, today's generation of navy pilots is successfully adding to these glorious traditions. As in the terrible war years, the recent pupils of the Komsomol, the young pilots, are on the forward line. They are flying the most complex aircraft under any conditions--day and night, over Arctic ice and the "howling 40th" latitudes. All of those splendid qualities of which I have already spoken are characteristic of them.

Take, for example, one of the officers that you met on the anti-submarine cruiser--Major Valeriy Gaitnyanko. He recently, as they say, graduated from the Komsomol age bracket, but he has already earned the solid authority of a commander, a fearless and skillful pilot.

Major Yuriy Churilov, Captain Vladimir Baluk, Senior Lieutenant Valeriy Peregpechko--I could recite even more names of young pilots who have successfully mastered modern equipment and who at the same time have displayed real courage.

I also want to say a kind word about the rotary wing aircraft representatives who displayed high combat training condition on a recent trip. They lifted their aircraft from the cruiser's deck at any time of the day in any weather. At times they have had to travel great distances from the ship to successfully accomplish their assigned tasks. Imagine what it would be like to fly a similar flight on a pitch-dark night!

Young officers have also made up the backbone of the helicopter subunit.

[Question] The sky will always attract young people. Today's youths, who enviously follow each airplane with their eyes, will sit at aircraft controls tomorrow. What would you like to wish them--the future subjugators of the heights beyond the clouds--from the loftiness of your life experience?

[Answer] In the first place they should cultivate within themselves a love for the motherland. It is necessary that each cell in his body be aware of his own bond of blood with the fatherland, that he be a patriot--this is the chief duty of every citizen of our country. It is important to learn to love work, because without this it is impossible to become a pilot. It is impossible to dream of the sky if you are a person who is indifferent to or nonchalant about what is happening around you. Today's pilot has within himself, equally with deep professional skills, a high degree of public activity and a broad mental outlook. This does not come by itself, his character must be formed from childhood.

I especially want to emphasize the quality of a highly developed sense of responsibility--without this no flying equipment, even the most faultless, can make you a real pilot.

A naval pilot is a fusion of will, courage, boldness, and daring. Each flight over the ocean has been covered with romance. That person who even once sees his wings over the sea and truly holds the sea sky in his hands will be true to the naval pilot's profession for his whole life.

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LOGISTICAL SERVICES AND SPECIAL TROOPS

SOVIET LOGISTICAL CAPABILITIES REVIEWED

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No 5, May 81 pp 242-247

[Article by Lt Col Guenter Lippert: "Logistics in the Soviet Ground Forces"]

[Text] "Uninterrupted material and technical support is a decisive prerequisite for successful conduct of combat operations and the most important duty of the commanders, their deputies for logistical support and technical equipment, as well as the chiefs of the various combat arms, of special units, and support services" (Soviet Field Service Regulations¹).

Supplying the ground forces with all supply items required for the accomplishment of their mission according to Soviet terminology--in the NVA [National People's Army] translation--is referred to as "rear-area support." It comprises the following:

"Material support," that is to say, assembling and delivering supply items;

"Support for armored vehicles and motor vehicles," that is to say, maintenance, repair, and recovery of vehicles;

"Technical backup support," that is to say, maintenance, repair, and recovery of weapons and other equipment; and

"Medical support," that is to say, medical services.

Their implementation is the job of the "rear-area services." They include all logistical personnel and installations although they do not constitute a separate branch of the service.

Responsibilities

The absence of a compact logistics force is paralleled by the absence of uniform responsibility for all logistical functions, apart from the fundamental responsibility of the particular unit commander.

From the regimental level on up, the "deputy commander for rear-area services" is responsible for the coordination of logistics. He is the director of the particular "rear-area services" section, that is to say, he is the G-4 of his unit's staff.

The overall chief of rear-area services is the deputy defense minister for rear-area services and director of the Main Department for Rear-Area Services in the Defense Ministry of the Soviet Union, currently Army Gen S. Kurkotkin. The chiefs of the rear-area services, in terms of unit command, are under their commanders whereas in technical terms they are under the chief of rear-area services of the next higher command echelon. The deputy commander for rear-area services is directly responsible for the equipment and supply:

Of large-volume consumer goods including rations, clothing, and fuel,

Individual equipment and

Medical and veterinary equipment.

He is supported in this activity by specialists from the fuel service, the ration service, the clothing and equipment service, and the medical or veterinary service. Moreover, he is responsible for the following:

The handling of the delivery of all supply items, including the coordination of traffic control;

The operation and surveillance of all logistical installations in the rear area of his particular unit;

The security of the rear area of his unit; and

Overall logistical planning as well as supervision over its implementation.

In the course of logistical planning, the chief of rear-area services is supported by the chiefs of the combat arms, the special units, and the services of his unit's headquarters. They in turn are responsible for supply shipments and for the repair of equipment peculiar to their particular branch of the service and they accomplish this supply task by way of a pilot function also for the other branches of the service. Regarding this supply task, they are under the corresponding supply officer on the next higher command echelon. Specifically, we have the following responsibilities:

Rocket units and artillery: for all artillery equipment, all small arms, and all types of ammunition and explosives;

Armored forces: for all armored combat vehicles;

Motor vehicle transport units: for all unarmored vehicles;

Communications units: for all communications equipment;

Engineer units: for all Engineer equipment;

CWS units (NBC defense forces): for all NBC monitoring equipment, decontamination equipment and agents.

Logistical planning is coordinated by the deputy commander for rear-area services with the "deputy commander for technical equipment" who, on the particular command echelon, is responsible for all those repair functions for which there is no separate service branch chief or service director. He is supported in his work by specialists from the technical services (for example, technical services for tanks, motor vehicles, and ordnance).

Organization and Personnel

On the company and battery level, the company or battery CO himself is responsible for supply functions. In supply matters he is supported by the company first sergeant while in repair matters he is supported by the maintenance sergeant who is referred to as "deputy company CO for technical equipment." Besides, the company has one medical corps NCO.

On the battalion level--under the responsibility of the battalion CO--the "chief of staff"--a kind of combined S-3 and S-4 officer--handles all supply matters. He is supported by the supply platoon leader and by the medical NCO who is in charge of the medical team. All repair matters are within the purview of the "deputy battalion CO for technical equipment" who is roughly equivalent to the technical officer in the West German Armed Forces. He is supported by the leader of the repair team and by a NBC instructor and a weapons repair specialist. The battalion's supply platoon consists of a supply squad and a transport squad. The latter has about ten trucks with trailers.

Only on the regimental level, on which all special supply lines terminate, do we have a separate "deputy for rear-area services" who coordinates all supply functions. He is supported by the following:

The "deputy regimental CO for technical equipment" (technical staff officer), responsible for the repair of all of the regiment's vehicles (on that level, this includes tanks and armored combat vehicles), the resupply of the necessary spare parts and the evacuation of damaged vehicles;

The regiment's "chief of artillery" (regimental artillery commander) who, in addition to his tactical mission, is also responsible for the repair of guns, mortars, and infantry weapons as well as the delivery of the required spare parts and all types of ammunition.

The "chief of special units" in the regiment, that is to say, the communications officer, the Engineer officer, and the NBC defense officer who, in addition to their tactical mission, are responsible for the repair of equipment peculiar to their branch of service and for the resupply of the required spare parts and consumer items;

The directors of the ration service, the POL service and the clothing and equipment service;

The regimental medical officer.

By way of supply units, we have, on the regimental level, a transport company with a capacity of 500 tons, a repair company, and a medical company.

On the divisional, army and army group levels, the organization of logistics is fundamentally the same. Only some responsibility areas, which on the lower echelons are still combined, are found to be further subdivided and, within the various responsibility areas, competences are broken down and spread out over a larger number of specialists for specific subject fields. For instance, starting from the army echelon, on up, we have a separate "chief of armored forces" who is responsible for resupply and for the repair of all tanks and armored vehicles, while this function is handled for unarmored vehicles by the "chief of the motor vehicle transportation service."

By way of supply personnel, we have, on the divisional level, a transportation battalion with a capacity of about 1,750 tons, a repair battalion, and a medical battalion.

The personnel strength of supply units on the army and army group levels depends on the number of subordinated divisions or field armies. As a rule, the field army has one or two transportation regiments, while the army group has one or two transport brigades. On top of that we have repair and medical units as well as field hospitals. The army group furthermore has at least one pipeline construction brigade under it.

Unless needed for tactical airborne operations, aircraft and helicopters of the transport units of the front-line air armies may be used to assemble supply concentration points, to close gaps, and quickly to deliver high-grade supply items, such as, perhaps, nuclear warheads.

Principles and Foundations

To understand this organization we must describe the most important principles of Soviet logistics.

The supply delivery principle prevails fundamentally: the next-higher command echelon must use its resources in order to deliver supplies to the subordinate units. Only in exceptional cases will the regiments and divisions pick up supply items from rear-area supply installations themselves. On the other hand, it is also possible to skip command echelons for supply delivery functions. Casualties and damaged equipment are of course picked up by the next-higher medical corps or repair facility.

The combat units are relieved of supply functions to the maximum possible extent.

Strict priorities have been laid down for supply functions. The sequence is as follows: ammunition or fuel², spare parts, and rations.

All supply needs going beyond that are reduced to an absolute minimum.

The implementation of repair work on equipment and medical backup support for personnel are handled as far forward as possible in order to be able to return

equipment and personnel to combat as quickly as possible and to save time and resources for evacuation.

Local resources and captured equipment are used extensively.

Individuals responsible for logistics are included in semistrategic planning at an early stage in order to be able to guarantee the implementation of supply functions.

Here are the fundamentals of the Soviet Army's logistical system:

A high degree of standardization of all weapons and equipment which facilitates manufacture and repair;

Simplicity and sturdiness of weapons and equipment;

Thorough testing and drilling of supply functions under field conditions;

Relatively undemanding attitude and low expectation levels of military personnel regarding individual supply needs;

Individual improvisation capability already acquired in civilian life.

Supply Management in War

The Soviet Armed Forces distinguish between the tactical, the semistrategic and the strategic rear areas. Considering the current deployment of forces facing Western Europe, the latter term covers Soviet national territory; the non-Soviet WP [Warsaw Pact] countries represent the semistrategic rear areas in the Western approaches to the armies and army groups stationed in the USSR³ (semistrategic units). The rear area of their deployed divisions (tactical units) constitutes the tactical rear area. Accordingly, they make a distinction between semistrategic and tactical rear-area services in the ground forces.

Resupply from depots and industrial plants in the strategic base to the semistrategic rear area--in view of the absence of an efficient road net--must depend almost exclusively on rail and maritime transport. In addition, elements of the military air transport service (VTA) and civil aviation (AEROFLOT) are available for the delivery of important supply items and personnel.

To reduce the dependence on rail and maritime shipment, voluminous supply dumps were established already in peacetime for the Soviet forces in the glacis. In case of war, army groups and field armies will establish additional supply dumps in the vicinity of rail junctions and rail lines. The supply dumps of the army groups--separated by supply items--are about 150-200 kilometers behind the boundary lines of the rear areas of armies committed forward while those of the armies are placed about 100 kilometers behind the forward lines of fighting units. Large-volume consumer goods are subdivided in the army supply dumps into packets which can be put on trucks or highway tank cars. Moreover, the armies in most cases establish advanced, as a rule mixed army supply dumps right behind the rear boundaries of the divisions in the first echelon.

The tactical rear-area services of the divisions establish their supply areas usually in the vicinity of road intersections or along a main highway. The supply goods delivered by army to those places are mostly transloaded on motor vehicles and kept ready, on call, on those vehicles. In addition, other supply items can be stored on the ground to back up large-scale operations.

The supply points of the regiments are mostly located near roads leading to the supply areas of the divisions. The supply items delivered by division are likewise kept ready on vehicles, so that they can be delivered when called for.

The battalions as a rule establish only ammunition supply and ration points as well as motor vehicle repair and field dressing stations while the regiment handles their POL resupply, the evacuation of damaged equipment, and weapons repair.

On the defensive, companies establish ammunition supply, rations, and medical support points. During the attack, all required supply items are directly delivered to them. The table below provides an idea as to the distances between the supply installations and the foremost lines (during the attack) or from the FEBA (on the defensive) for elements in the first echelon.

Unit	Supply Installation	Distance from foremost line	Distance from FEBA
Company	Ammunition supply point	-	100-150 m
	Rations supply point	-	up to 1 km
	Medical support point		100 m
Battalion	Ammunition supply point	4 km	2-3 km
	Repair point	5 km	3-5 km
	Rations supply point	5 km	3-5 km
	Field dressing station	1.5-3 km	1.5-3 km
Regiment	Ammunition supply point	10-15 km	10-20 km
	Repair point	up to 15 km	up to 20 km
	POL supply point	10-15 km	10-20 km
	Rations supply point	10-15 km	10-20 km
	Main dressing station	5-7 km	6-10 km
	Damaged motor vehicle collecting point	5-7 km	6-10 km
Division	Supply dump (ammunition, POL, rations)	25-30 km	35-50 km
	Repair point (tanks, weapons)	20-40 km	36-60 km
	Repair point (wheeled motor vehicles)	10-14 km	up to 20 km
	Main dressing station	10-14 km	up to 20 km

Logistical Peculiarities During the Attack

Bulk Supply Goods

The primary mission of rear-area services during the attack is to guarantee supply with bulk consumer goods in such a manner that the combat units will be able to operate over greater distances without interruption. For this purpose, the basic load of the units is first of all adapted to the mission: during the initial phase of the attack, larger quantities of ammunition are taken along as a rule while larger quantities of fuel are taken along as the attack continues. Advance detachments and units employed for flank protection are issued adequate supplies of bulk consumer goods for the entire duration of their mission. During the attack preparation phase, supply points are set up far forward for all kinds of large-volume supply items. That applies especially to POL supply points. The idea is to make sure that the combat units will be able to cross the jump-off line with their fuel tanks full. Advanced ammunition supply points in the combat sectors of the divisions and regiments belonging to the first echelon are designed to keep supply lines short. Besides, artillery ammunition is stored in advance in recon firing positions in order to keep the basic issue of the batteries--especially the on-board supply of armored howitzers--untouched as long as possible.

For the logistical buildup and resupply during the attack, the transportation equipment of the divisions in the first echelon are reinforced by the transportation equipment of the army and/or the divisions in the second echelon. Besides, army transportation equipment can be used to deliver supply items from the army group supply dumps to the advanced army supply dumps.

As a guidelines for the range and duration, we can assume that the T/O&E transportation equipment of a motorized rifle division, with proportional reinforcement from the army transportation facilities, will suffice in order to carry 5 days' supply of ammunition, POL, and rations for all subordinate units. By virtue of that, the division has a considerable degree of logistical mobility.

Repair

To be able to spot damaged combat vehicles as quickly as possible and to order their recovery and repair, the deputy battalion CO's for technical equipment observe the attack mounted by their battalions from mobile technical observation points and follow them from one technical observation point to the next.

The tech OP of a tank or motorized rifle battalion mostly consists of a BTR-60 APC which in addition to the deputy battalion CO for technical equipment also holds the deputy company commander for technical equipment, two or three relief drivers, one repair service enlisted man, one Engineer, one medic, and the NBC instructor of the battalion. The tech OP is connected into the command circuit of the battalion and maintains radio contact with the deputy regimental CO for technical equipment and the repair and rescue squad of the battalion. The latter comprises the repair team of the battalion and the reinforcements assigned by regiment to the battalions of the first echelon; those reinforcements mostly consist of a recovery vehicle as well as a repair team with a workshop and spare parts vehicle.

When combat vehicles are knocked out, the deputy battalion CO for technical equipment, by radio or personal inspection, determines the place as well as the type and extent of damage; if necessary, he orders first aid to be administered, he determines the repair priority and then accordingly assigns the repair and recovery squad. It has the mission of moving damaged vehicles to cover as quickly as possible and making the vehicles, which can be repaired with its resources, on the spot, again ready for action. The exact location and the damage of vehicles that cannot be repaired with the battalion's resources are reported to the deputy regimental CO for technical equipment who will order their recovery and repair by the repair units of the regiment or their evacuation to the damaged vehicle collecting point of the division. As guideline we can accept the idea that battalion resources cannot be used to perform any type of repair work that takes more than 5 hours of work. Priority is given to the repair of combat vehicles which can be returned to action as quickly as possible.

Medical Backup Support

The main dressing stations of regiments and divisions are established far forward. Prior to the start of the attack, all casualties who might still be there are removed so that they will have their full reception capacity during the initial phase of the attack. After rescue and first-aid administered by the medics of the companies as well as screening and preliminary medical care at the battalion aid stations, casualties are picked up by the transport vehicles of the regiment's medical company and receive initial medical care at the regiment's main dressing station. From there they are picked up with the transportation vehicles of the division's medical battalion.

To support the divisions in the first echelon, a mobile army field hospital as a rule is set up far forward in the rear division area. In case of large numbers of casualties, its transportation equipment is also used for the direct evacuation of casualties from the dressing stations of the battalions and regiments. In addition to the transportation space of the medical units, supply vehicles returning empty are used to evacuate casualties.

Supply Standards

The most important computation units for the equipment, supply, and resupply of large-volume consumer goods are as follows:

The initial combat issue,

The replenishment issue, and

The daily ration issue.

The combat issue is a certain quantity of ammunition which is specified for each weapon or each weapons system on the basis of the manner of employment, technical characteristics, and past experience. The number of rounds for a particular combat issue is in a firm ratio to the total volume of ammunition as rule carried along directly by the unit (company, battery). For example, the combat issues for the on-board weapons of combat vehicles correspond to the on-board supply carried

along for them because additional ammunition supplies are not carried along in the combat units. One combat issue for the main armament thus includes for example the following:

For the T-54 battle tank: 34 rounds of 100-mm ammunition;
For the T-62 battle tank: 40 rounds of 115-mm ammunition;
For the T-64/72 battle tank: 40 rounds of 125-mm ammunition;
For the BMP APC: 40 rounds of 73-mm ammunition;
For the BTR-60 PB (Armored Troop Carrier) AIFV: 500 rounds of 14.5-mm ammunition;
For the ZSU-23-4 armored AA mount: 4x600 rounds of 23-mm ammunition.

For weapons systems where additional ammunition is carried along within the unit on transport vehicles belonging to the system, the combat issue is mostly twice as large as the on-board supply. For example, one combat issue consists of the following:

For the BM-21 multiple rocket launcher: 80 rockets, 122-mm;
For the SA-4 AA guided missile system: 4 GANEF guided missiles;
For the SA-6 AA guided missile system: 6 GAINFUL guided missiles;
For the SA-9 AA guided missile system: 8 GASKIN guided missiles.

Correspondingly, the combat issue for a mortar or gun includes the number of shells which are carried along directly on the traction vehicles and transport vehicles of the firing battery for the particular weapon, for example:

For the 82-mm mortar: 120 shells;
For the 122-mm field howitzer: 85 rounds;
For the 152-mm gun-howitzer: 60 rounds.

The combat issue, which roughly corresponds to the combat load used in the West German Armed Forces, is primarily a logistical computation factor. The "ammunition norm" is decisive for tactical ammunition employment for a certain mission or period of time. It is specified in the service regulations of the particular branches of the service and it is the theoretically computed average quantity of ammunition required to accomplish a specific firing mission with the given weapon.

Replenishment is the computation basis for POL supply. Related to the individual vehicle, it is the fuel quantity which is taken by the fixed, installed tanks and the supplementary tanks which are organically assigned to the vehicle. The replenishment [refueling] of a minor or major unit is the fuel volume necessary for the complete refueling of all of its vehicles. Thus, we have the following fuel volumes:

For a T-64/72 tank battalion, about 35 cubic meters,
For a motorized rifle battalion (BMP [APC]) about 13 cubic meters,
For a T-64/72 tank regiment, about 120 cubic meters, and
For a motorized rifle regiment (BMP), about 105 cubic meters.

As guideline we can assume that the transportation equipment of the battalions themselves and the regiment's transportation space, together, can carry along two replacement refueling issues.

Rations are computed according to daily ration issues. Per man, they figure on 2.5 kilograms of standard fresh rations with about 3,000 calories or about 1 kilogram of dehydrated rations for emergency use. Battalions and independent units generally carry one daily ration issue while regiments carry two and divisions carry four or five daily ration issues along.

Equipment for Rear-Area Services

Parallel to the modernization of the equipment of the combat and combat support units of the Soviet ground forces and the related reorganizations and reinforcements, which SOLDAT UND TECHNIK described in detail in No 1, 1980, the necessary qualitative and quantitative adjustment of the equipment of the rear-area services to higher requirements was accomplished during the decade of 1970-1980. In particular, during that interval of time, the capacity of the transport units was almost tripled to meet the rising ammunition and fuel consumption figures of modern combat vehicles. This increase in transportation capacity was achieved partly by increasing the number of transport vehicles and trailers and partly by introducing more efficient vehicles and improved transloading equipment.

The following are the standard supply vehicles from the third postwar generation of Soviet trucks which are today being used by the units, especially those units that are stationed in the approaches to the Soviet Union:

The 4x4 ZIL-130 [Plant im. Likachyev], engine capacity: 125 kilowatts, payload on highway 3.5 tons, cross-country 4 tons, trailer load 4.5 tons;

The 6x6 ZIL-131 truck, engine capacity: 110 kilowatts, payload on highway 5 tons, cross-country 3.5 tons, trailer load on highway 6.7 tons, cross-country 4 tons;

The 6x6 URAL-375D truck, engine capacity 128 kilowatts, payload on highway 7.5 tons, cross-country 4.5 tons, trailer load on highway 10 tons, cross-country 5 tons; and

The 6x6 KRAZ-255B truck, engine capacity: 176 kilowatts, payload on highway and cross-country 8 tons, trailer load on highway 30 tons, cross-country 10 tons.

Tank truck versions are available for all of these types. The tank truck version of the ZIL-131 can carry 4,200 liters, that of the URAL-375D can carry 5,500 liters of fuel. With the usual 4,700-liter trailer, one URAL-375 truck-trailer combination can thus carry 10,200 liters.

The latest standard vehicle most recently introduced was probably the successor to the URAL-375D, the 6x6 URAL-4320 truck which was tested starting in 1977. It has an engine capacity of 154 kilowatts. Its payload has been reported at 5 tons by the Soviet technical press, with 7 tons for the trailer load. The tank truck version of this vehicle is labeled ATMZ-5-4320. It can carry 5,000 liters of fuel and 250 liters of lubricants. The vehicle's fueling system is operated by one man and can dispense 750 liters per minute via four pumps [release points].

Fuel containers made of rubberized fabric are used to set up advanced POL supply points; depending upon the type, they have a capacity between 4 and 250 cubic meters. The smaller ones (4-6 cubic meters) can be carried by helicopters⁴.

A series of new repair vehicles, equipped with NBC protection systems, was introduced for the repair services on the basis of the ZIL-131 and URAL-375D trucks. They include for example the "PAOM-1M mobile repair shop for wheeled and tracked vehicles," the "mobile repair shop for Engineer equipment," and the "RMTF mobile repair workshop for ration supply service equipment"⁵. Moreover, the MTP repair and recovery vehicle was introduced for motorized rifle units equipped with the BMP APC. This is a version of the BTR-50 P armored transport vehicle; by virtue of its cross-country capability, armor, and NBC protection, it can follow the combat units across any terrain and under all combat conditions and can render technical assistance to them on the battlefield⁶.

The rations service was also adapted to modern requirements through the introduction of a series of new special vehicles, such as field kitchens, special vehicles for rations transportation and mobile field bakeries. They are likewise equipped with the ZIL-131 and URAL-375D vehicles. In addition, new and extensively ready-to-use canned and dehydrated ration issues and rations have been introduced⁷.

Analysis

The logistical system of the Soviet ground forces is geared toward relieving the combat units as much as possible of any supply functions. Without "ballast" in terms of personnel and materiel, which cannot be directly translated into combat strength, they are to be able to operate freely and to obtain the required high attack tempo. The personnel strength of the Soviet combat battalions, regiments, and divisions thus is by 30-50 percent smaller than that of Western units of comparable combat strength. On the other hand, the bulk of the Soviet Army's supply personnel and resources is concentrated on the field army and army group levels.

By virtue of this highly economical concentration, resulting from the supply delivery principle, the high command is in a position, during offensive operations, based on its own initiative and planning, to form and move supply concentration points at the right time. Centrally controlled supply system employment of course here does limit the ability of the subordinate command echelons fully to utilize unforeseen opportunities, to develop their own initiatives, and to handle crises on their own.

The Soviet supply system can have a disadvantageous effect especially if the enemy seizes the initiative and if the flow of supplies can no longer be diverted to new concentration points at the right time. But because Soviet military doctrine always stresses the primacy of the offensive and because the belief in the plan predominates also in the military sector, we find that such risks are being accepted. Overall, the logistical system is thus consonant with the theory of war and meets the requirements of extensively preplanned offensive combat command determined primarily by the order-issuing tactic.

FOOTNOTES

1. In the Soviet ground forces, the following are referred to as combat branches: motorized rifle units, tank units, airborne units, rocket units and artillery, unit AA defense forces. Special units among others are the following: Engineer units, signal units (communications units), CWS units (NBC defense units), motor vehicle transport units, construction units. The services, which must support the combat branches and special units, include the rear-area services covered in this article as well as, for example, the military topographic service, etc.

2. This depends on the type of combat. On the defensive and during the first phase of an attack, ammunition has first priority whereas during the follow-up on a successful attack and especially during pursuit, fuel has priority.
3. In case of war--possibly due to the addition of further Soviet or non-Soviet WP forces--the "groups of units" stationed in the approaches to the Soviet Union are converted into army groups. Additional army groups are formed from the military districts of the USSR.
4. For details, see SOLDAT UND TECHNIK, No 6, 1980, p 330.
For details, see SOLDAT UND TECHNIK, No 3, 1978, p 114, and No 7, 1978, p 390.
6. For details, see SOLDAT UND TECHNIK, No 9, 1979, p 492.
7. For details, see SOLDAT UND TECHNIK, No 3, 1978, p 114.



Army Gen S. K. Kurkotkin,
the supreme Soviet logistician



Ammunition supply: battle
tank taking on ammunition



Fuel supply: standard tank truck,
Model ATS-5.5-375; base vehicle:
6x6 URAL-375D cross-country truck;
capacity 5,500 liters.



Fuel supply: standard tank trailer,
PTS 4.7-782B; capacity 4,700 liters.



Ammunition supply:
transloading ammunition
with the help of a con-
veyor belt.



Fuel supply: TUM-150
pipeline laying vehicle
of the pipeline construc-
tion brigade, shown taking
on pipe.



Fuel supply: pumping
station on pipeline.



Fuel supply: refueling
a T-55 tank company at a
POL supply point.



Fuel supply: establishing
a forward POL supply point,
using tanks made of rubberized
fabric.



Equipment maintenance: re-
pair of a 122-mm M 1974
armored howitzer at the place
where it was knocked out,
using the mobile PARM-1M
repair shop on cross-country
6x6 ZIL-131 truck.



Equipment maintenance: MTP repair and recovery vehicle, armored, to accompany BMP motorized rifle units on the battlefield.



Equipment maintenance: field repair of a 122-mm M-30 field howitzer.

Medical corps: mobile regimental dressing station, made up of AP-2 dressing station vehicles.



Medical corps: AP-2 dressing station vehicle on cross-country 4x4 GAZ-66 [Gor'kiy Motor Vehicle Plant] truck.



Medical corps: AS-66 ambulance; base vehicle: 4x4 GAZ-66 cross-country truck; nine stretcher spaces and four seats.



Medical corps: LUAZ-967 M amphibious ambulance for use on battlefield, with two stretcher spaces and two seats.

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June 24, 1981